Course Description

Doing grand strategy is hard. So is making sense of grand strategy in real time. Harry S Truman was one of the most unpopular presidents in history when he left office; today, his presidency is often considered a grand strategic golden age. George W. Bush’s grand strategy looked awesome in late March 2003…and then it didn’t.

In this course, we'll try to make of what the Biden administration has tried to do in the world since taking office, where it has succeeded and failed, and what sort of legacy it might leave to its eventual successor. We'll discuss questions like: What is grand strategy? What was Biden's initial grand strategic concept and how did it change under the pressure of events? How has this administration handled issues like the withdrawal from Afghanistan, the competition with China, the war in Ukraine, and the conflict in the Middle East? Perhaps most important, we'll try to come up with analytical frameworks and tools that help us all think systematically and intelligently about events that are unfolding before our eyes. If you’re a SAIS grad, people are going to be asking you to talk about current events and how they relate to the larger picture for the rest of your life. This course is meant to help you master that skill.

To that end, this course is based on active discussion involving all participants. The course will be run as a seminar, and it will feature healthy amounts of debate (both structured and informal) as well as oral presentations and other forms of active learning. I therefore weight class participation heavily, and I expect that you will have read, marked up, and intellectually grappled with all the readings prior to class. You are also expected to follow the news on major issues of U.S. foreign policy and world affairs—this is essential. Our discussions will be guided as much by what is in the news from day to day as they will be by the readings on the syllabus.

It is, unfortunately, impossible to cover all aspects of Biden’s foreign policy in a single semester. Thus, the course is designed to allow students to fill in gaps that the syllabus leaves. We will do so by leaving time for discussion of pressing issues and breaking events at the beginning of most classes. You will have a chance, as part of the group project, to identify an issue that you wish to study in more detail and share with the class. And you will get to pick, collectively, the issue we cover in Week 9.

It’s also possible that something huge will happen between now and the time this class begins—after all, we are doing this in real time. So please understand that the syllabus may shift considerably over the course of the semester.

Ground Rules

• Academic dishonesty will result in you failing the class and, potentially, harsher penalties.
• Don’t be absent; don’t be late. If you can’t commit to being on time, this is not the class for you. If you are late for class, you lose half of the available participation grade for that day.
• You must participate actively, every week. It is the only way I can tell who is actively engaging with the readings and the core issues. If you come to class and do not speak, you will receive a failing participation grade. A good rule of thumb: Come in with one comment or one question for every reading.
• Grading is, ultimately, somewhat subjective. But I pledge to be fair and offer substantive feedback. The grade range breaks down as follows: A (exceptional); B (good to very good); C (needs a lot of work); D (doesn’t understand the key issues/topics); F (unsatisfactory, fails to engage with the issues in a meaningful way).

Professor Hal Brands

Henry.brands@gmail.com

Office: 555P Seventh Floor

Office Hours: Send me an email and I will be delighted to set up a time. I am also typically available before, and sometimes after, our class meetings.

Course Materials

Hal Brands, What Good is Grand Strategy? Power and Purpose in American Statecraft from Harry S. Truman to George W. Bush (2014)

Ground Rules

• Academic dishonesty will result in you failing the class and, potentially, harsher penalties.
• Don’t be absent; don’t be late. If you can’t commit to being on time, this is not the class for you. If you are late for class, you lose half of the available participation grade for that day.
• You must participate actively, every week. It is the only way I can tell who is actively engaging with the readings and the core issues. If you come to class and do not speak, you will receive a failing participation grade. A good rule of thumb: Come in with one comment or one question for every reading.
• Grading is, ultimately, somewhat subjective. But I pledge to be fair and offer substantive feedback. The grade range breaks down as follows: A (exceptional); B (good to very good); C (needs a lot of work); D (doesn’t understand the key issues/topics); F (unsatisfactory, fails to engage with the issues in a meaningful way).

Course Requirements

• Class participation: 40%
• Short paper: 20%
• Group presentation: 10%
• Final group paper: 30%

Class participation involves actively and productively engaging in discussions and debates during our weekly sessions, and demonstrating deep engagement with the readings.  It also involves more prosaic matters like being present and on time for class. 

The short paper will be an essay of no more than 1400 words, due during Part II of the course. You can pick when you would like to write the paper—for each week, there is a different prompt/question to which you will respond. Papers are due via email prior to the beginning of class on the week in question. 

Group presentation and group paper. Early in the semester, you will divide into groups and select one aspect of Biden’s foreign policy to examine—his efforts to achieve global action on climate change, for example, or his trade policy. You should not choose an issue that we have already discussed in one of our sessions (the Afghanistan withdrawal, for example), although there may be offshoots of one of those issues that are fair game (a study of his approach to semiconductors, for example).

Your group will research this topic extensively, with an eye to answering the following questions: 1) What was the challenge the Biden team confronted? 2) What policy did it develop in response? 3) Did the policy shift or evolve over time? 4) How effective was the policy? 5) Given what was known at the time, should anything have been done differently? 6) How does your evaluation of this policy fit into a larger evaluation of Biden’s grand strategy?

In week 11 or week 12, your group will present a rough draft of your findings to me and to the class for a friendly murder-boarding. On the last day of class, you will submit your group paper, a product of no more than 8,000 words, to me via email before class begins. If you do a really good job, this is the sort of paper you might be able to submit for publication somewhere.

The word limit, for this paper, and every paper, includes literally every single piece of text on the page—notes, your name, etc. Writing short is a skill. Don’t go long.

Course Requirements

• Class participation: 40%
• Short paper: 20%
• Group presentation: 10%
• Final group paper: 30%

Class participation involves actively and productively engaging in discussions and debates during our weekly sessions, and demonstrating deep engagement with the readings.  It also involves more prosaic matters like being present and on time for class. 

The short paper will be an essay of no more than 1400 words, due during Part II of the course. You can pick when you would like to write the paper—for each week, there is a different prompt/question to which you will respond. Papers are due via email prior to the beginning of class on the week in question. 

Group presentation and group paper. Early in the semester, you will divide into groups and select one aspect of Biden’s foreign policy to examine—his efforts to achieve global action on climate change, for example, or his trade policy. You should not choose an issue that we have already discussed in one of our sessions (the Afghanistan withdrawal, for example), although there may be offshoots of one of those issues that are fair game (a study of his approach to semiconductors, for example).

Your group will research this topic extensively, with an eye to answering the following questions: 1) What was the challenge the Biden team confronted? 2) What policy did it develop in response? 3) Did the policy shift or evolve over time? 4) How effective was the policy? 5) Given what was known at the time, should anything have been done differently? 6) How does your evaluation of this policy fit into a larger evaluation of Biden’s grand strategy?

In week 11 or week 12, your group will present a rough draft of your findings to me and to the class for a friendly murder-boarding. On the last day of class, you will submit your group paper, a product of no more than 8,000 words, to me via email before class begins. If you do a really good job, this is the sort of paper you might be able to submit for publication somewhere.

The word limit, for this paper, and every paper, includes literally every single piece of text on the page—notes, your name, etc. Writing short is a skill. Don’t go long.

Schedule

Part 1: Foundations

Week 1 (Jan 22): What is Grand Strategy?

• Hal Brands, What Good is Grand Strategy?, 1-16. Choose also 2 of the 4 substantive chapters (on Truman, Nixon/Kissinger, Reagan, and Bush) to read, and come ready to discuss what those case studies teach you about the practice of grand strategy
• Daniel Drezner, Ronald Krebs, Randall Schweller, “The End of Grand Strategy: America Should Think Small,” Foreign Affairs, May/June 2020
• Rebecca Lissner, “What is Grand Strategy? Sweeping a Conceptual Minefield,” Texas National Security Review, 2018
• John Lewis Gaddis, “What is Grand Strategy?” April 2009, https://indianstrategicknowledgeonline.com/web/grandstrategypaper.pdf
• Peter Feaver, “What is Grand Strategy and Why Do We Need It?” Foreign Policy, April 8, 2009

Week 2 (Jan 29): The Inheritance, Part 1—The World of January 2021

• Charles Krauthammer, “The Unipolar Moment,” Foreign Affairs, 1990/1991
• Hal Brands and Eric Edelman, “The Upheaval,” The National Interest, July/August 2017
• Kurt Campbell and Ely Ratner, “The China Reckoning,” Foreign Affairs, March-April

2018

• Robert Kagan, “The Strongmen Strike Back,” Washington Post, March 14, 2019
• Lawrence Summers, “COVID-19 Looks Like a Hinge in History,” Financial Times, May 14, 2020
• Kurt Campbell and Rush Doshi, “The Coronavirus Could Reshape Global Order,” Foreign Affairs, March 18, 2020
• Thomas Wright, “The Center Cannot Hold,” Foreign Affairs, September/October 2021
• Hal Brands and Michael O’Hanlon, “The War on Terror Has Not Yet Failed,” Survival, August-September 2021
• Kevin Drum, “Tech World,” Foreign Affairs, July/August 2018
• National Intelligence Council, “Climate Change and International Responses Increasing Challenges to US National Security Through 2040,” 2021, https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/assessments/NIE_Climate_Change_and_National_Security.pdf

Week 3 (Feb 5): The Inheritance, Part 2—the Obama/Trump Legacy

• Hal Brands, “Barack Obama and the Dilemmas of American Grand Strategy,” Washington Quarterly, Winter 2017
• Nadia Schadlow, “The End of American Illusion: Trump and the World as It Is,” Foreign Affairs, September/October 2020
• Summary of the National Defense Strategy, January 2018, https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2018-National-Defense-Strategy-Summary.pdf
• Richard Haass, “The Age of America First,” Foreign Affairs, November-December 2021
• Hal Brands, “The Last Chance for American Internationalism,” Foreign Affairs, January 20, 2021
• Emma Ashford, “America Can’t Promote Democracy Abroad. It Can’t Even Protect It at Home,” Foreign Policy, January 7, 2021
• Jonathan Kirschner, “Trump’s Long Shadow and the End of American Credibility,” Foreign Affairs, March/April 2021

Week 4 (Feb 12): The Biden Foreign Policy Concept

• Interim National Security Strategic Guidance, March 2021, https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/NSC-1v2.pdf
• US National Security Strategy, October 2022, https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/Biden-Harris-Administrations-National-Security-Strategy-10.2022.pdf
• US National Defense Strategy, October 2022, https://media.defense.gov/2022/Oct/27/2003103845/-1/-1/1/2022-NATIONAL-DEFENSE-STRATEGY-NPR-MDR.PDF (you don’t have to read the MDR and NPR that are attached to this document)
• Hal Brands, “The Emerging Biden Doctrine,” Foreign Affairs, June 29, 2021
• Antony Blinken, “A Foreign Policy for the American People,” March 3, 2021

Part II: Crises and Challenges

Week 5 (Feb 15): The Afghanistan Withdrawal (with guest speaker)--PLEASE NOTE THAT THIS CLASS IS ON THURSDAY, FEB 15 RATHER THAN MONDAY, FEB 19

• Carter Malkasian, “How the Good War Went Bad,” Foreign Affairs, March/April 2020.
• Steve Coll and Adam Entous, “The Secret History of the U.S. Diplomatic Failure in Afghanistan,” New Yorker, December 20, 2021
• Andrew Prokop, “Why Biden Was So Set on Withdrawing from Afghanistan,” Vox, August 18, 2021
• Jonathan Schroden, “Lessons from the Collapse of Afghanistan’s Security Forces,” CTC Sentinel, October 2021.
• “Remarks by President Biden on the End of the War in Afghanistan,” August 31, 2021, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2021/08/31/remarks-by-president-biden-on-the-end-of-the-war-in-afghanistan/
• Helene Cooper et al., “In Afghan Withdrawal, a Biden Doctrine Surfaces,” New York Times, September 4, 2021
• Kori Schake, “The Roads Not Taken In Afghanistan,” Foreign Affairs, August 25, 2021
• Daniel Benjamin and Steven Simon, “Beyond Forever War,” Foreign Affairs, September 10, 2021
• White House, “The U.S. Withdrawal from Afghanistan,” March 2023, https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2023/04/US-Withdrawal-from-Afghanistan.pdf
• Hal Brands, “What Went Wrong in the Afghan Pullout? Biden’s Not Saying,” Bloomberg, April 14, 2023

For papers, assess this statement: Biden’s withdrawal from Afghanistan was a major strategic misstep.

Week 6 (Feb 26): The War in Ukraine

• “Something Was Badly Wrong,” Politico, Oral History of Ukraine War, February 24, 2023
• Joint Statement of the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China on the International Relations Entering a New Era and the Global Sustainable Development, February 4, 2022, https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/CASI/documents/Translations/2022-02-04%20China%20Russia%20joint%20statement%20International%20Relations%20Entering%20a%20New%20Era.pdf
• Max Seddon et al, “How Putin Blundered Into Ukraine—then Doubled Down,” Financial Times, February 23, 2023
• Hal Brands, “Ukraine and the Contingency of Global Order,” Foreign Affairs, February 14, 2023
• Remarks by President Biden on the United Efforts of the Free World to Supprot the People of Ukraine, March 26, 2022, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2022/03/26/remarks-by-president-biden-on-the-united-efforts-of-the-free-world-to-support-the-people-of-ukraine/
• Michael Kofman and Rob Lee, “Beyond Ukraine’s Offensive,” Foreign Affairs, May 10, 2023
• Peter Harrell, “The Limits of Economic Warfare,” Foreign Affairs, March 27, 2023
• Samuel Charap et al, “Avoiding a Long War,” RAND Corporation, 2023
• “Ukraine’s Commander-in-Chief on the Breakthrough He Needs to Beat Russia,” The Economist, November 1, 2023
• Susan Glasser, “Jake Sullivan’s Trial by Combat,” New Yorker, October 16, 2023
• Hal Brands, “Making Biden’s Free World Strategy Work,” Foreign Affairs, May 24, 2022

For papers, assess this statement: Thanks to Biden’s leadership, the war in Ukraine has been a strategic defeat for Russia and a strategic victory for the West.

Week 7 (March 4): Iran, Israel, and the Middle East War of 2023

• Steven Cook, “No Exit,” Foreign Affairs, November/December 2020
• Suzanna Maloney, “After the Iran Deal,” Foreign Affairs, March/April 2023
• F. Gregory Gause, “The Kingdom and the Power,” Foreign Affairs, January/February 2023
• Fareed Zakaria, “A Peace Deal between Israel and the Saudis Could Change Everything,” Washington Post, September 29, 2023
• Natan Sachs, “America’s Israel Conundrum,” Foreign Affairs, July 28, 2023
• Amos Yadlin, “Netanyahu Can’t Have It All,” Foreign Affairs, March 7, 2023
• Suzanne Maloney, “The End of America’s Exit Strategy in the Middle East,” Foreign Affairs, October 10, 2023
• Remarks by President Biden on the United States’ Response to Hamas’s Terrorist Attacks against Israel and Russia’s Ongoing Brutal War Against Ukraine, October 20, 2023, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2023/10/20/remarks-by-president-biden-on-the-unites-states-response-to-hamass-terrorist-attacks-against-israel-and-russias-ongoing-brutal-war-against-ukraine/
• Mark Leonard, “The Global Consequences of the Israel-Hamas War,” Project Syndicate, November 3, 2023
• Assaf Orion, “The End of Israel’s Gaza Illusions,” Foreign Affairs, November 3, 2023

For papers, evaluate the following statement: The Hamas attacks against Israel on October 7, 2023 demonstrated the bankruptcy of Biden’s policy toward the Middle East.

Week 8 (March 11): The China Challenge

• Kurt Campbell and Jake Sullivan, “Competition without Catastrophe,” Foreign Affairs,

Sept/Oct 2019

• Antony Blinken, “The Administration’s Approach to the People’s Republic of China,” May 26, 2022, https://www.state.gov/the-administrations-approach-to-the-peoples-republic-of-china/
• Gregory Allen, “China’s New Strategy for Waging the Microchip Tech War,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, May 3, 2023
• Charles Edel, “The AUKUS Wager,” Foreign Affairs, August 4, 2023
• Christopher Twomey, “The Fourth Taiwan Strait Crisis is Just Starting,” War on the Rocks, August 22, 2022
• Ashley Tellis, “America’s Bad Bed on India,” Foreign Affairs, May 1, 2023
• Michael Beckley, “Delusions of Détente,” Foreign Affairs, September/October 2023
• Hal Brands, “Deterrence in Taiwan is Failing,” Foreign Policy, Fall 2023
• Zack Cooper, “Biden’s Asia Diplomacy is Still Incomplete,” War on the Rocks, August 23, 2023
• Jude Blanchette and Christopher Johnstone, “The Illusion of Great-Power Competition,” Foreign Affairs, July 24, 2023
• Remarks by Janet Yellen at SAIS, April 20, 2023, https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy1425
• James Crabtree, “U.S.-China De-Risking Will Inevitably Escalate,” Foreign Policy, August 20, 2023

For papers, evaluate the following statement: Biden has steered a prudent middle course on China, strengthening America’s competitive position without tipping the relationship into outright conflict.

Week 9 (March 25): Subject TBD

• Readings TBD

Paper: TBD

Part III: Presentations and Summing Up

Week 10 (April 1): Group Project Work and Meetings

Week 11 (April 8): Group Presentations

Week 12 (April 15): Group Presentations

Week 13 (April 22): Interpretations and Legacies. PLEASE NOTE THAT THIS CLASS WILL LIKELY BE HELD VIRTUALLY, TO ACCOMMODATE A POTENTIAL GUEST SPEAKER

• Jake Sullivan, “The Sources of American Power,” Foreign Affairs, November/December 2023
• Joshua Shifrinson and Stephen Wertheim, “Biden the Realist,” Foreign Affairs, September 9, 2021
• Antony Blinken, “The Power and Purpose of American Diplomacy in a New Era,” September 13, 2023, https://www.state.gov/secretary-antony-j-blinken-remarks-to-the-johns-hopkins-school-of-advanced-international-studies-sais-the-power-and-purpose-of-american-diplomacy-in-a-new-era/
• Daniel Drezner, “Bracing for Trump 2.0,” Foreign Affairs, September 5, 2023
• Kori Schake, “Biden’s Foreign Policy is a Mess,” Foreign Affairs, February 10, 2023
• Hal Brands, “Biden’s Foreign Policy Vision is Officially Dead,” Bloomberg, October 29, 2023

Final papers due by email before final class begins